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STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
This is an appeal from an order entered by the Second 
Judicial District Court for Weber County, State of Utah, sus-
taining an action by the Drivers License Division of the State 
of Utah revoking plaintiff-appellant's license for refusal to 
take a chemical test pursuant to 41-6-44.10, Utah Code Annota-
ted (1953 As Amended). The case was tried without a jury be-
fore the Honorable Calvin Gould presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Plaintiff-appellant filed suit to avoid an order by the 
State Drivers License Division revoking her drivers license 
for refusal to submit to a chemical test pursuant to 41-6-
44.10, Utah Code Annotated (1953 As Amended). Pursuant to 
this action, a trial ue nova was held. Plaintiff-appellant 
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now appeals from the order of the District Court dismiss-
ing plaintiff's petition and sustaining the Drivers License 
Divisionfs order revoking her drivers license. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-appellant seeks reversal of the trial courtfs 
ruling that once one is advised of the implied consent law, 
"any response other than agreement to take the test is a 
constructive refusal". It is further requested that this 
action be remanded to the trial court with instructions to 
find that plaintiff-appellant's license is not subject to 
revocation under the provisions of 41-6-44.10, Utah Code 
Annotated (1953 As Amended) or that plaintiff-appellant is 
V t t C x i r J L U V i W-V/ C* L4.WW C i - l U l t 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On August 20, 1974, at about 9:00 a.m., Mrs. Hyde 
entered the parking lot at St. Benedict's Hospital in 
Ogden, Utah, to do volunteer work as a "pink lady" (Tr. 30). 
She pulled partially into a parking stall and then backed 
up to straighten out her auto. While backing up, she struck 
another vehicle (Tr. 31). An off-duty highway patrolman 
observed the collision and approached appellant's vehicle. 
He proceeded to call the Ogden City Police and physically 
restrained appellant when she attempted to walk about in the 
parking lot (Tr. 4). The trooper, noticing a smell of "some 
-2- x 
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type of alcoholic beverage11 and after making certain visual 
observations, "could tell something was wrong". He did not 
place her under arrest but did force her to return to her 
automobile to await the arrival of the Ogden police (Tr* 5). 
When officer Ronald K. Nichols of the Ogden Police Depart-
ment arrived, the trooper related his observations to Officer 
Nichols and departed (Tr. 6). 
Officer Nichols asked appellant for her drivers license 
which she produced from her wallet. She was told to get out 
of the vehicle. She protested, stating that she was on priv-
ate property and they thus had no authority. She was then 
physically removed from her vehicle (Tr. 15). She was placed 
under arrest for "driving under the influence of alcohol", 
advised of her Miranda rights (Tr. 10), handcuffed and placed 
in the back seat of a patrol car (Tr. 9). 
Officer Nichols, having less than two months1 experience 
on the force (Tr. 22), asked Officer Robert W. Hales to handle 
the "implied consent law". He testified that Officer Hales 
entered the back seat with appellant and "tried to give her 
the implied consent law" (Tr. 10). Officer Hales testified 
that although he went over the implied consent law twice, 
"she wouldn't listen". When she responded by stating she 
wanted to go home and requested that the handcuffs be re-
moved. Officer Hales advised Officer Nichols "that in mv 
-3-
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mind this was a refusal11 (Tr. 26) . 
Officer Nichols then transferred appellant from the 
hospital parking lot to the Weber County Jail and Officer 
Hales remained behind to investigate the accident• 
Officer Nichols requested, and Mrs* Hyde performed, 
certain dexterity tests at the jail (Tr. 13)* She was 
then allowed to use the telephone to call her husband and 
to try unsuccessfully to reach her attorney (Tr. 12, 34). 
When appellant finished making her phone calls, Officer 
Nichols departed the jail, leaving her in the custody of 
the jail matron (Tr. 12). Nothing was said at the jail 
concerning the implied consent law or the tests required 
thereunder, even though Officer Hales had told Mrs. Hyde 
ffthe test would be taken at the jail". Officer Nichols 
went immediately downstairs and filed a refusal report 
with the State (Tr. 20). 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS HOLDING THAT ONCE ONE 
IS ADVISED OF THE IMPLIED CONSENT LAW, "ANY RESPONSE 
OTHER THAN AGREEMENT TO TAKE THE TEST IS A CONSTRUCTIVE 
REFUSALo" 
The trial courtfs holding (Tr. 41) represents a 
strict and arbitrary standard not previously recognized 
by this court- It is not justified and should not be 
-4-
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allowed to stand particularly in the case at bar* 
Ao Mrs. Hyde was not accorded a reasonable time to 
comprehend what was being asked of her or to make up her 
mind or seek legal counsel. 
The report of the refusal shows the time of arrest as 
9:45 a.m., and the time of refusal as 9:50 a.m. (Tr. 21). 
The record further shows that most of the five minutes 
allotted was expended awaiting the arrival of someone more 
experienced than the arresting officer, capable of advising 
Mrs. Hyde of the implied consent law (Tr. 10). 
The officerfs testimony indicates that Officer Hales 
made two abortive attempts to explain the implied consent 
law to Mrs. Hyde. When she responded by challenging their 
right to arrest her and by demanding that they remove her 
handcuffs, Officer Hales concluded, nokay, that's a refusal11 
(Tr. 18, 26). 
Officer Nichols then transported Mrs. Hyde to jail and 
filed the refusal report without further discussion of the 
implied consent law or request that she submit to a breath 
or blood test (Findings of Fact, paragraphs 8 and 10). It 
is significant to note that upon arrival at the jail Mrs* 
Hyde was asked to perform certain dexterity tests and she 
fully complied with these requests (Tr. 13). The officers 
had testified that she had been told that she would be 
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given the tests desired under the implied consent law at 
the jail. However, no personnel were called or present to 
administer either the blood or breathalizer tests. It is 
clear that Officer Nichols accepted in total Officer Hales1 
conclusion that they had a refusal out at the scereof the 
arrest and had no need to renew their warnings or requests 
at the time when the tests could in fact have been adminis-
tered. 
There is no indication in the record that either 
Officer Nichols or Hales suggested to Mrs. Hyde that she 
might want to consult an attorney before deciding whether 
or not to take the tests being offered her (Tr. 25, 26). 
When she arrived at the jail, she was allowed to make some 
phone calls and tried unsuccessfully to contact her attorney 
(Tr. 34). Even if she had reached an attorney and been 
advised to take the tests, she apparently would have had 
no opportunity to f,reconsidern the refusal entered earlier. 
In Hunter v. Dorius, 23 Utah 2d 122, 458 P.2d 1258 
(1969) at 879, this court concluded that after one has 
been advised as to rights under this statute and the conse-
quences of his refusal to submit to a test, he still has a 
"reasonable time in which to make up his mind and to seek 
legal counsel11. Clearly, no such opportunity or courtesy 
was extended Mrs. Hyde. 
-6-
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Bo The State failed to produce any evidence that 
Mrs, Hyde knowingly and intentionally refused to take 
the test. 
It is quite clear from the record that Mrs. Hyde 
did not comprehend what Officer Hales was saying regard-
ing the implied consent law. According to the police 
account, she said she wasnft going to listen (Tr. 17) 
and they acknowledge that she did not (Tr. 26)0 She made 
no statements indicating that she understood what was 
being asked of her. All of her utterances dealt with the 
propriety of her arrest (Tr. 16). The arresting officer 
admitted that at no time did she specifically say anything 
akin to "I will not take any test11 (Tr. 17, 28). 
Mrs. Hyde testified that she had no familiarity with 
the implied consent law prior to her arrest (Tr. 31) and 
was not aware that she had been offered or had refused the 
tests (Tr. 32). She stated that the first she heard of 
the alleged refusal was around September 12, approximately 
20 days after her arrest, when she received a notice from 
the State of Utah (Trc 35)• 
The officers repeatedly made reference to her emotional 
condition and she at various times described her condition 
while talking to them as "uncomfortable11, "frightened11, 
"terriblv unset", and "confused" (Tr. 38}. 
* M. 0 « * 
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I 
tier condition should not have been unexpected. She I 
.„^.ij. — 
was a fifty-five year-old lady (Tr. 34) involved in an 
accident. She was accused of being intoxicated prior to 
10:00 in the morning and physically restrained from report- | 
ing to her place of work (Trc 32). She had been manhandled 
first by a highway patrolman forcing her to re-enter her 
automobile (Tr. 5) and then by Officers Nichols and Johnson 
when removing her from the same automobile (Tr. 8). She 
had suffered the indignity of being arrested, handcuffed, 
read her "Miranda" rights and forced to sit on public dis-
play in the back seat of a patrol car for approximately 
five minutes awaiting the arrival of someone allegedly 
qualified to handle advising her of the implied consent 
law (Tr. 10, 15). 
C. Mrs. Hyde's response was not an unequivocal re-
jection or a constructive refusal of the tests. 
Whether or not Mrs. Hyde was legally correct in her 
contention that the officers had no right to arrest her 
on private property need not be determined. Certainly, 
under the circumstances, her attempts to protest the 
police action did not constitute the type of unequivocal 
rejection of the tests necessary to excuse the officers 
from supplying further information to her. See Rust v. 
Department of Public Vehiclesy 73 Cal. Rptr. 366 (1963)• 
. *
:
 \ 
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CONCLUSION 
The evidence fails to establish that Mrs. Hyde 
knowingly and intentionally refused to take the test 
requested. She was not accorded reasonable time to compre-
hend what was being asked of her or to make up her mind or 
seek legal counsel. Furthermore, her responses did not 
constitute the type of unequivocal rejection of the tests 
necessary to excuse the officers from supplying further 
information to her. The trial courtfs finding of a 
"constructive refusal11 under these circumstances should not 
be allowed to stando 
Respectfully submitted, 
WILLIAM Do MARSH 
Attorney for Plaintiff-
Appellant 
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